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Abstract
Given a set A of n people, with each person having a preference list that ranks
a subset of A as his/her acceptable partners in order of preference, we consider the
Roommates Problem (rp) and the Marriage Problem (mp) of matching people with
their partners. In rp there is no further restriction, while in mp only people with
opposite genders can be matched. For a pair of matchings X and Y , let φ(X,Y ) denote
the number of people who prefer the person they get matched by X to the person they
get matched by Y , and define an unpopularity factor u(M) of a matching M to be the
maximum ratio φ(M ′,M)/φ(M,M ′) among all other possible matchings M ′. In this
paper, we develop an algorithm to compute the unpopularity factor of a given matching
in O(m
√
n log2 n) time for rp and in O(m
√
n logn) time for mp, where m is the total
length of people’s preference lists. We also generalize the notion of unpopularity factor
to the weighted setting where people are given different voting weights and show that
our algorithm can be slightly modified to support that setting with the same running
time.
Keywords: unpopularity factor, popular matching, perfect matching, Marriage
Problem, Roommates Problem
1 Introduction
The Stable Marriage Problem is one of the most actively studied problems in theoretical
computer science, with many applications in other fields such as economics [11, 20]. In the
original setting called Marriage Problem (mp), a set of n/2 men and a set of n/2 women are
given, with each person having a preference list that ranks all people of opposite gender in
strict order of preference. A man m and a woman w are called a blocking pair if they are
not matched to each other but prefer each other to their own partners in M . A matching
M is called stable if it does not admit any blocking pair. Gale and Shapley [7] proved that
a stable matching always exists in any instance and developed an O(n2) algorithm to find
one. Their algorithm can be adapted to the setting where each person’s preference list may
∗This paper is an extended version of [22], which appeared at CSR 2019.
†
ruangwises.s.aa@m.titech.ac.jp
‡titoh@c.titech.ac.jp
1
not contain all people of opposite gender. It runs in O(m) time in this setting, where m is
the total length of people’s preference lists [11].
The Stable Roommates Problem is a generalization of the original Stable Marriage
Problem to the non-bipartite setting called Roommates Problem (rp), where each person
can be matched with anyone regardless of gender. Unlike in mp, a stable matching in rp
does not always exist. Irving [14] developed an O(n2) algorithm to find a stable matching
or report that none exists in a given rp instance, where n is the number of people.
1.1 Popular Matchings
Apart from stability, another well-studied property of a “good” matching is popularity. For
a pair of matchings X and Y , let φ(X,Y ) denote the number of people who prefer a person
they get matched by X to a person they get matched by Y . A matching M is called
popular if φ(M,M ′) ≥ φ(M ′,M) for any other matching M ′. The concept of popularity
of a matching was first introduced by Gardenfors [8] in the context of the Stable Marriage
Problem. He also proved that in an mp instance with each person’s preference list being
strict (containing no tie), every stable matching is popular (but not vice-versa), hence a
popular matching always exists.
The problem of determining whether a popular matching exists in a given instance,
however, becomes more difficult in other settings. Biró et al. [3] proved that when ties
among two or more people in the preference lists are allowed, the problem of determining
whether a popular matching exists in a given mp or rp instance is NP-hard. Recently,
Faenza et al. [6] and Gupta et al. [10] independently proved that this problem is still NP-
hard for rp even when people’s preference lists are strict. Cseh and Kavitha [4] showed that,
in a complete graph rp instance where each person’s preference list is strict and contains all
other people, the problem of determining whether a popular matching exists can be solved
in polynomial time for an odd n but is NP-hard for an even n.
Problems related to popular matchings were also extensively studied in the setting of
one-sided preference lists (matching each person with a unique item, where each person has
a list that ranks items but each item does not have a list that ranks people) called House
Allocation Problem (hap). Abraham et al. [1] developed an algorithm to find a popular
matching in a given hap instance, or report that none exists. The algorithm runs in O(m+n)
time when people’s preference lists are strict and in O(m
√
n) time when ties are allowed,
wherem is the total length of people’s preference lists and n is the total number of people and
items. Mestre [19] later generalized that algorithm to the setting where people are given
different voting weights, while Manlove and Sng [17] generalized it to the setting where
each item is allowed to be matched with more than one person called Capacitated House
Allocation Problem (chap). Mahdian [16] studied the randomized version of this problem
where people’s preference lists are strict, complete (containing all items), and randomly
generated, and showed that a popular matching exists with high probability in a random
hap instance if the ratio of the number of items to the number of people is greater than
a specific constant. Ruangwises and Itoh [21] later generalized Mahdian’s study to the
case where preference lists are strict but not complete and found a similar behavior of the
probability of existence of a popular matching. Abraham and Kavitha [2] proved that in
any instance with at least one popular matching, one can achieve a popular matching by
conducting at most two majority votes to force a change in assignments, starting at any
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matching. Kavitha et al. [15] introduced the concept of a mixed matching, which is a
probability distribution over a set of matchings, and proved that a mixed matching that is
“popular" always exists.
1.2 Unpopularity Measures
While a popular matching may not exist in some instances, several measures of “badness”
of a matching that is not popular have been introduced. In the one-sided preference lists
setting, McCutchen [18] introduced two such measures: the unpopularity factor and the
unpopularity margin. The unpopularity factor u(M) of a matching M is the maximum ratio
φ(M ′,M)/φ(M,M ′) among all other possible matchings M ′, while the unpopularity margin
g(M) is the maximum difference φ(M ′,M)− φ(M,M ′) among all other possible matchings
M ′. Note that the two measures are not equivalent as φ(M ′,M) and φ(M,M ′) may not
add up to the number of people since some people may like M and M ′ equally, thus it is
possible for a matching to have higher unpopularity factor but lower unpopularity margin
than another matching. See Example 1.
McCutchen developed an algorithm to compute u(M) and g(M) of a given matching
M of an hap instance in O(m
√
n2) and O((g + 1)m
√
n) time, respectively, where n2 is the
number of items and g = g(M) is the unpopularity margin of M . He also proved that the
problem of finding a matching that minimizes either measure is NP-hard. Huang et al. [13]
later developed an algorithm to find a matching with bounded values of these measures in
hap instances with certain properties.
The notions of unpopularity factor and unpopularity margin also apply to the setting
of two-sided preference lists (matching people with people). Biró et al. [3] developed an
algorithm to determine whether a given matching M is popular in O(m
√
nα(n,m) log3/2 n)
time for rp (later improved to O(m
√
n log n) time when running with the recent fastest al-
gorithm to find a maximum weight perfect matching of Duan et al. [5]) and in O(m
√
n) time
for mp, where α is the inverse Ackermann’s function. Their algorithm also simultaneously
computes the unpopularity margin of M during the run. Huang and Kavitha [12] proved
that an rp instance with strict preference lists always has a matching with unpopularity
factor O(log n), and it is NP-hard to find a matching with the lowest unpopularity factor,
or even the one with less than 4/3 times of the optimum.
Example 1. Consider the following rp instance. A set in a preference list means that all
people in that set are ranked equally, e.g. a2 equally prefers a1 and a4 as his first choices
over a3.
Preference Lists
a1 : a4, a2, a3
a2 : {a1, a4}, a3
a3 : {a1, a4}, a2
a4 : {a2, a3}, a1
M0 = {{a1, a2}, {a3, a4}}
M1 = {{a1, a3}, {a2, a4}}
M2 = {{a1, a4}, {a2, a3}}
In this example, φ(M0,M1) = 1, φ(M1,M0) = 0, φ(M0,M2) = 3, φ(M2,M0) = 1,
φ(M1,M2) = 3, and φ(M2,M1) = 1. Therefore, M0 is popular, while u(M1) =∞, g(M1) =
1 − 0 = 1, u(M2) = 3/1 = 3, and g(M2) = 3 − 1 = 2. Observe that M1 has higher
unpopularity factor but lower unpopularity margin than M2.
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1.3 Our Contribution
The algorithm of Biró et al. [3] determines whether a given matching M is popular and
also simultaneously computes the unpopularity margin of M , hence we currently have an
algorithm to compute an unpopularity margin of a given matching in O(m
√
n log n) time
for rp and in O(m
√
n) time for mp. However, there is currently no efficient algorithm to
compute an unpopularity factor of a given matching in mp and rp.
In this paper, we develop an algorithm to compute the unpopularity factor of a given
matching, using a similar idea to [3]. The algorithm runs in O(m
√
n log2 n) time for rp
and in O(m
√
n log n) time for mp. We also generalize the notion of unpopularity factor
to the weighted setting where people are given different voting weights, and show that our
algorithm can be slightly modified to support that setting with the same running time.
2 Preliminaries
Let I be an rp or mp instance consisting of a set A = {a1, ..., an} of n people, with each
person having a preference list that ranks a subset of A as his/her acceptable partners in
order of preference. In rp there is no further restriction, while in mp people are classified
into two genders, and each person’s preference list can contain only people with opposite
gender. Throughout this paper, we consider a more general setting where ties among two or
more people are allowed in the preference lists. Also, let m be the total length of people’s
preference lists.
For a matching M and a person a ∈ A, let M(a) be the person matched with a in M
(for convenience, let M(a) = null if a is unmatched in M). Also, let ra(b) be the rank of
a person b in a’s preference list, with the most preferred item(s) having rank 1, the second
most preferred item(s) having rank 2, and so on (for convenience, let ra(null) =∞).
For any pair of matchings X and Y , we define φ(X,Y ) to be the number of people who
strictly prefer the person they get matched by X to the person they get matched by Y , i.e.
φ(X,Y ) = |{a ∈ A|ra(X(a)) < ra(Y (a))}|.
Also, let
∆(X,Y ) =
{
φ(Y,X)/φ(X,Y ), if φ(X,Y ) > 0;
∞, otherwise.
Finally, define an unpopularity factor
u(M) = max
M ′∈M−MM
∆(M,M ′),
where M is the set of all matchings of a given instance I and MM is the set of all matchings
M ′ with φ(M,M ′) = φ(M ′,M) = 0. Note that a matching M is popular if and only if
u(M) ≤ 1.
3 Unweighted Setting
We first consider an unweighted setting where every person has equal voting weight.
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3.1 rp Instances
Let I be an rp instance, M be a matching of I, and k be an arbitrary positive real number.
Similarly to [3], we construct an undirected graph H(M,k) with vertices A ∪A′, where A′ =
{a′1, ..., a′n} is a set of “copies" of people in A. An edge {ai, aj} exists if and only if ai is
in aj ’s preference list and aj is in ai’s preference list; an edge {a′i, a′j} exists if and only if
{ai, aj} exists; an edge {ai, a′j} exists if and only if i = j.
However, we will assign weights to edges of H(M,k) differently from [3]. For each pair of
i and j with an edge {ai, aj}, define δi,j as follows.
δi,j =


1, if ai is unmatched in M or ai prefers aj to M(ai);
−k, if ai prefers M(ai) to aj ;
0, if {ai, aj} ∈M or ai likes aj and M(ai) equally.
For each pair of i and j, we set the weights of both {ai, aj} and {a′i, a′j} to be δi,j+δj,i. Also,
for each edge {ai, a′i}, we set its weight to be −2k if ai is matched in M , and 0 otherwise.
See Example 2.
Example 2. Consider the following matching M in an rp instance.
Preference Lists
a1 : a2, a3, a4
a2 : a3, a1
a3 : a1, a2, a4
a4 : a1, a3
M = {(a1, a2), (a3, a4)}
δi,j
j
1 2 3 4
i
1 0 -2 -2
2 0 1
3 1 1 0
4 1 0
a1
a2
a3
a4
a′1
a′2
a′3
a′4
0 2
0-1
-1
02
0 -1
-1
-4
-4
-4
-4
The values of all δi,j are shown in the above table, and the auxiliary graph H(M,2) is
shown on the right.
The intuition of this auxiliary graph is that we want to check whether u(M) > k, i.e.
whether there exists another matching M ′ with the number of people who prefer M ′ to
M more than k times the number of those who prefer M to M ′. Each matching M ′ is
represented by a perfect matching of H(M,k) consisting of the edges of M ′ in A as well as
their “copies" in A′, with each unmatched person ai being matched with his own copy a′i.
The intuition of assigning weights to the edges is that we add 1 for each person who prefers
M ′ to M and subtract k for each one who prefers M to M ′, and then check whether the
sum is positive.
The relation between u(M) and H(M,k) is formally shown in the following lemma.
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Lemma 1. u(M) > k if and only if H(M,k) contains a positive weight perfect matching.
Proof. For any matching M ′, define A1(M ′) = {ai ∈ A|ai is matched in M ′} and A2(M ′) =
{ai ∈ A|ai is unmatched in M ′}. Also, define
A+1 (M
′) = {ai ∈ A1(M ′)|ai is unmatched in M or ai prefers M ′(ai) to M(ai)};
A−1 (M
′) = {ai ∈ A1(M ′)|ai prefers M(ai) to M ′(ai)};
A−2 (M
′) = {ai ∈ A2(M ′)|ai is matched in M}.
We have φ(M ′,M) = |A+1 (M ′)| and φ(M,M ′) = |A−1 (M ′)|+ |A−2 (M ′)|.
Suppose that u(M) > k. From the definition of u(M), there must be a matching M0
such that φ(M0,M) > kφ(M,M0). In the graph H(M,k), consider a perfect matching
S0 = M0 ∪ {{a′i, a′j}|{ai, aj} ∈M0} ∪ {{ai, a′i}|ai is unmatched in M0}
with weight W0. From the definition, we have
W0 = 2
(|A+1 (M0)| − k|A−1 (M0)|)− 2k|A−2 (M0)|
= 2
(|A+1 (M0)| − k (|A−1 (M0)|+ |A−2 (M0)|))
= 2(φ(M0,M)− kφ(M,M0))
> 0,
hence H(M,k) contains a positive weight perfect matching.
On the other hand, suppose there is a positive weight perfect matching S1 ofH(M,k) with
weight W1. See Example 3. Let M1 = {{ai, aj} ∈ S1} and M2 = {{ai, aj}|{a′i, a′j} ∈ S1}.
Since S1 is a perfect matching of H(M,k), we have A2(M1) = A2(M2), and
0 < W1
=
(|A+1 (M1)| − k|A−1 (M1)|) + (|A+1 (M2)| − k|A−1 (M2)|)− 2k|A−2 (M1)|
=
(|A+1 (M1)| − k|A−1 (M1)|) + (|A+1 (M2)| − k|A−1 (M2)|)− k|A−2 (M1)| − k|A−2 (M2)|
= (φ(M1,M)− kφ(M,M1)) + (φ(M2,M)− kφ(M,M2)).
Thus, we must have φ(M1,M) > kφ(M,M1) or φ(M2,M) > kφ(M,M2), which means
u(M) > k.
Example 3. Consider the auxiliary graphs H(M,2) and H(M,3) constructed from a matching
M in Example 2.
a1
a2
a3
a4
a′1
a′2
a′3
a′4
0 2
0-1
-1
02
0 -1
-1
-4
-4
-4
-4
a1
a2
a3
a4
a′1
a′2
a′3
a′4
0 2
0-2
-2
02
0 -2
-2
-6
-6
-6
-6
On the left, H(M,2) has a positive weight perfect matching consisting of the bold-faced
edges, but on the right, H(M,3) does not. This implies 2 < u(M) ≤ 3.
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For a given value of k, the problem of determining whether u(M) > k is now reduced
to detecting a positive weight perfect matching of H(M,k), which can be done by finding the
maximum weight perfect matching of H(M,k).
Lemma 2. Given an rp instance I, a matching M of I, and a number k = x/y, where
x ∈ [0, n−1] and y ∈ [1, n] are integers, there is an algorithm to determine whether u(M) > k
in O(m
√
n log n) time.
Proof. From Lemma 1, the problem is equivalent to determining whether H(M,k) has a pos-
itive weight perfect matching. Observe that H(M,k) has O(n) vertices and O(m) edges, and
we can multiply the weights of all edges by y so that they are all integers with magnitude
O(n). Using the recently developed algorithm of Duan et al. [5], we can find a maxi-
mum weight perfect matching in a graph with integer weight edges of magnitude poly(n) in
O(m
√
n log n) time, hence we can detect a positive weight perfect matching in O(m
√
n log n)
time.
We can now efficiently compute u(M) by performing a binary search on all possible
values of it.
Theorem 1. Given an rp instance I and a matching M of I, there is an algorithm to
compute u(M) in O(m
√
n log2 n) time.
Proof. Observe that if u(M) is not ∞, it must be in the form of x/y, where x ∈ [0, n − 1]
and y ∈ [1, n] are integers, meaning that there are at most O(n2) possible values of u(M).
By performing a binary search on the value of k = x/y (if u(M) > n− 1, then u(M) =∞),
we run the algorithm in Lemma 2 for O(log n2) = O(log n) times, hence the total running
time is O(m
√
n log2 n).
3.2 mp Instances
The running time of the algorithm in Theorem 1 is for a general rp instance. However, in
an mp instance we can improve it using the following approach. First, consider a matching
S = M ∪ {{a′i, a′j}|{ai, aj} ∈M} ∪ {{ai, a′i}|ai is unmatched in M}
of the graph H(M,k). Since S is a perfect matching, every perfect matching of H(M,k) must
consist of a number of alternating cycles relative to S. Moreover, from the definition of
δi,j , every edge of S has zero weight. Therefore, H(M,k) contains a positive weight perfect
matching if and only if it contains a positive weight alternating cycle relative to S. Hence,
the problem becomes equivalent to detecting a positive weight alternating cycle (relative to
S) in H(M,k). Note that this property holds for every rp instance, not limited to only mp.
However, the special property of mp is that the graph H(M,k) is bipartite, so we can
divide the vertices of H(M,k) into two parts H1 and H2 with no edge between vertices in the
same part. We then orient the edges of S toward H1 and all other edges toward H2, hence
the problem of detecting a positive weight alternating cycle becomes equivalent to detecting
a positive weight directed cycle (see Example 4), which can be done in O(m
√
n) time using
the shortest path algorithm of Goldberg [9]. Therefore, by performing a binary search on
u(M), the total running time for rp is O(m
√
n log n).
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Example 4. Consider the following matching M ′ in an mp instance.
Preference Lists
m1 : w1, w2
m2 : w1, w2
w1 : m2,m1
w2 : m1,m2
M ′ = {{m1, w1}, {m2, w2}}
m1
w1
m2
w2
m′1
w′1
m′2
w′2
0 2
0-1
02
0 -1
-4
-4
-4
-4
m1
w1
m2
w2
m′1
w′1
m′2
w′2
0 2
0-1
02
0 -1
-4
-4
-4
-4
On the left, H(M ′,2) has a positive weight perfect matching consisting of the bold-
faced edges, while S consists of the dotted edges. On the right, since H(M ′,2) is a bipartite
graph with parts H1 = {m1,m2, w′1, w′2} and H2 = {w1, w2,m′1,m′2}, we orient the edges of
S (dotted arrows) toward H2, and the rest toward H1. This directed graph has a positive
weight directed cycle consisting of the bold-faced arrows. Both figures imply u(M ′) > 2.
In a way similar to rp, we have the following lemma and theorem for mp.
Lemma 3. Given an mp instance I, a matching M of I, and a number k = x/y, where
x ∈ [0, n−1] and y ∈ [1, n] are integers, there is an algorithm to determine whether u(M) > k
in O(m
√
n) time.
Theorem 2. Given an mp instance I and a matching M of I, there is an algorithm to
compute u(M) in O(m
√
n log n) time.
4 Weighted Setting
The previous section shows the algorithm to compute an unpopularity factor of a given
matching in an unweighted rp or mp instance where every person has equal voting weight.
However, in many real-world situations, people might have different voting weights based on
position, seniority, etc. Our algorithm can also be slightly modified to support a weighted
instance with integer weights bounded by N = poly(n) with the same running time in both
rp and mp.
In the weighted setting, each person ai ∈ A has a weight w(ai). We analogously define
φ(M,M ′) to be the sum of weights of people who strictly prefer a matchingM to a matching
M ′, i.e.
φ(M,M ′) =
∑
a∈A(M,M′)
w(a),
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where A(M,M ′) = {a ∈ A|ra(M(a)) < ra(M ′(a))}. We also define ∆(M,M ′) and u(M) the
same way as in the unweighted setting. For each ai ∈ A, we assume that w(ai) is a non-
negative integer not exceeding N = poly(n). Note that an unweighted instance can be
viewed as a special case of a weighted instance where w(ai) = 1 for all ai ∈ A.
To support the weighted setting, we construct an auxiliary graph H(M,k) with the same
set of vertices and edges as in the unweighted setting, but with slightly different weights of
the edges. For each pair of i and j with an edge {ai, aj}, define
δi,j =


w(ai), if ai is unmatched in M or ai prefers aj to M(ai);
−kw(ai), if ai prefers M(ai) to aj;
0, if {ai, aj} ∈M or ai likes aj and M(ai) equally.
For each pair of i and j, the weights of {ai, aj} and {a′i, a′j} is δi,j + δj,i. Finally, for each
edge {ai, a′i}, we set its weight to be −2kw(ai) if ai is matched in M , and 0 otherwise.
The auxiliary graph H(M,k) still has the same relation with u(M), as shown in the
following lemma.
Lemma 4. In the weighted rp instance, u(M) > k if and only if H(M,k) contains a positive
weight perfect matching.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is very similar to that of Lemma 1. We define the sets
A1(M
′), A2(M ′), A+1 (M
′), A−1 (M
′), and A−2 (M
′) by the same way as in the proof of Lemma
1, but for each such set we will count the sum of weights of its elements instead of the number
of elements.
For any set B, define w(B) =
∑
a∈B w(a). We have φ(M
′,M) = w(A+1 (M
′)) and
φ(M,M ′) = w(A−1 (M
′)) + w(A−2 (M
′)).
Suppose that u(M) > k. There must exist a matching M0 such that φ(M0,M) >
kφ(M,M0). Similarly to the proof of Lemma 1, in the graph H(M,k) consider a perfect
matching
S0 = M0 ∪ {{a′i, a′j}|{ai, aj} ∈M0} ∪ {{ai, a′i}|ai is unmatched in M0}
with weight W0. From the definition, we have
W0 = 2
(
w(A+1 (M0))− kw(A−1 (M0))
)− 2kw(A−2 (M0))
= 2
(
w(A+1 (M0))− k
(
w(A−1 (M0)) + w(A
−
2 (M0))
))
= 2(φ(M0,M)− kφ(M,M0))
> 0,
hence H(M,k) contains a positive weight perfect matching.
On the other hand, suppose there is a positive weight perfect matching S1 of H(M,k)
with weight W1. Let M1 = {{ai, aj} ∈ S1} and M2 = {{ai, aj}|{a′i, a′j} ∈ S1}. Similarly to
the proof of Lemma 1, we have A2(M1) = A2(M2), and
0 < W1
=
(
w(A+1 (M1))− kw(A−1 (M1))
)
+
(
w(A+1 (M2))− kw(A−1 (M2))
) − 2kw(A−2 (M1))
=
(
w(A+1 (M1))− kw(A−1 (M1))
)
+
(
w(A+1 (M2))− kw(A−1 (M2))
)
− kw(A−2 (M1))− kw(A−2 (M2))
= (φ(M1,M)− kφ(M,M1)) + (φ(M2,M)− kφ(M,M2)).
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Therefore, we have φ(M1,M) > kφ(M,M1) or φ(M2,M) > kφ(M,M2), which implies
u(M) > k.
Since the weights of people are bounded by N = poly(n), the unpopularity factor u(M)
must be in the form k = x/y, where x and y are integers not exceeding Nn. For a given
value of k, if we multiply the weights of all edges of H(M,k) by y, they will be integers with
magnitude O(Nn) = poly(n). Therefore, we can still use the algorithm of Duan et al. [5]
to find a maximum weight perfect matching of H(M,k) with the same running time.
Moreover, there are at most O(N2n2) possible values of u(M). By performing a binary
search on the value of k, we have to run the above algorithm for O(logN2n2) = O(log n)
times as in the unweighted setting, hence the total running time is still O(m
√
n log2 n).
The argument for mp instances still works for the weighted setting as well since H(M,k)
is still bipartite, hence we have the following theorems for the weighted setting rp and mp.
Theorem 3. Given a weighted rp instance I with integer weights bounded by N = poly(n)
and a matching M of I, there is an algorithm to compute u(M) in O(m
√
n log2 n) time.
Theorem 4. Given a weighted mp instance I with integer weights bounded by N = poly(n)
and a matching M of I, there is an algorithm to compute u(M) in O(m
√
n log n) time.
5 Concluding Remarks
We develop an algorithm to compute the unpopularity factor of a given matching inO(m
√
n log2 n)
time for rp and O(m
√
n log n) time for mp, which runs only slightly slower than the algo-
rithm of McCutchen [18] to solve the same problem in hap and the algorithm of Biró et
al. [3] to compute the unpopularity margin of a given matching in rp and mp. Our results
also complete Tables 1 and 2, which show the running time of the currently best known
algorithms related to popularity in rp, mp, and hap in the unweighted setting with strict
preference lists, and with ties allowed, respectively. In both tables, m is the total length of
preference lists, n is the total number of people and items, n2 is the number of items (for
hap), and g is the unpopularity margin of a given matching.
While the problem of finding a matching that minimizes the unpopularity factor or
margin in a given matching is NP-hard, the problem of approximating the optimum of
either measure is still open. For the unpopularity factor in rp with strict preference lists, the
current best algorithm is the one developed by Huang and Kavitha [12], which approximates
it up to O(log n) factor. A possible future work is to investigate whether there is a better
approximation algorithm for rp, or to develop one for hap. For the unpopularity margin,
however, there is currently no efficient algorithm to approximate the optimum, both in rp
and hap. Another possible future work is to study the probability of existence of a popular
matching in rp where each person’s preference list is independently and uniformly generated
at random, similarly to the study of Mahdian [16] in hap.
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Two-sided Lists One-sided Lists
Roommates
Problem (rp)
Marriage
Problem (mp)
House Allocation
Problem (hap)
Determine if a popular
matching exists
NP-hard [6, 10]
O(m) [8]
O(m+ n) [1]
Find a matching M
that minimizes g(M)
NP-hard [18]
Find a matching M
that minimizes u(M)
NP-hard [12]
Test popularity
of a given matching M
O(m
√
n log n) [3, 5] O(m
√
n) [3]
O(m+ n) [1]
Compute g(M)
of a given matching M
O((g + 1)m
√
n) [18]
Compute u(M)
of a given matching M
O(m
√
n log2 n) [§3] O(m
√
n log n) [§3] O(m
√
n2) [18]
Table 1: Currently best known algorithms for an unweighted instance with strict preference
lists
Two-sided Lists One-sided Lists
Roommates
Problem (rp)
Marriage
Problem (mp)
House Allocation
Problem (hap)
Determine if a popular
matching exists
NP-hard [3]
O(m
√
n) [1]
Find a matching M
that minimizes g(M)
NP-hard [18]
Find a matching M
that minimizes u(M)
Test popularity
of a given matching M
O(m
√
n log n) [3, 5] O(m
√
n) [3]
O(m
√
n2) [18]
Compute g(M)
of a given matching M
O((g + 1)m
√
n) [18]
Compute u(M)
of a given matching M
O(m
√
n log2 n) [§3] O(m
√
n log n) [§3] O(m
√
n2) [18]
Table 2: Currently best known algorithms for an unweighted instance with ties allowed in
the preference lists
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